How important is …nancial development for economic development? A costly state veri…cation model of …nancial intermediation is presented to address this question. The model is calibrated to match facts about the U.S. economy, such as the intermediation spreads and the …rm-size distributions for 1974 and 2004. It is then used to study the international data using cross-country interest-rate spreads and per-capita GDPs. The analysis suggests a country like Uganda could increase its output by 116 percent if it could adopt the world's best practice in the …nancial sector. Still, this amounts to only 29 percent of the gap between Uganda's potential and actual output.
Introduction
How important is …nancial development for economic development? Ever since the publication of Raymond W. Goldsmith's (1969) classic book Financial Structure and Economic Development, economists have been developing theories and searching for empirical evidence connecting economic and …nancial development. Goldsmith emphasized the role that intermediaries play in steering funds to the highest-valued users in the economy. First, intermediaries collect and analyze information before they invest in businesses. Based on this information, they determine whether to commit savers' funds. If they proceed, then they must decide how much to invest and on what terms. Second, after allocating funds intermediaries must monitor …rms to ensure that savers'best interests are protected. Increases in the e¢ ciency of …nancial intermediation, due to improved information production, are likely to reduce the spreads between the internal rates of return on investments in …rms and the rate of return on savings received by savers. The spreads between these returns re ‡ect the costs of intermediation. These intermediation wedges include the costs of gathering ex ante information about investment projects, the ex post information costs of policing investments, and the costs of misappropriation of savers'funds by management, unions, and so on that arise in a world with imperfect information. An improvement in …nancial intermediation does not necessarily a¤ect the rate of return earned by savers. Aggregate savings may adjust in equilibrium so that this return always equals savers'rate of time preference.
The left panel of Figure 1 plots the intermediation wedge for the U.S. economy over time. (All data de…nitions are presented in the appendix.) The United States is a developed economy with a sophisticated …nancial system. The wedge falls only slightly. At the same time, it is di¢ cult to detect an upward trend in the capital-to-output ratio. Contrast this with Taiwan (shown in the right panel): There is a dramatic drop in the interest-rate spread.
As the cost of capital falls, one would expect to see a rise in investment. Indeed, the capitalto-output ratio for Taiwan shows a signi…cant increase. The observation that there is only a small drop in the U.S. interest-rate spread does not imply that there has been no technological advance in the U.S. …nancial sector. Rather, it may re ‡ect the fact that e¢ ciency in the U.S. …nancial sector has grown in tandem with the rest of the economy, while for Taiwan it has outpaced it. For without technological advance in the …nancial sector, banks would face a losing battle with the rising labor costs that are inevitable in a growing economy. The intermediation spread would then have to rise to cover costs; more on this later. Figure 2 shows that countries with lower interestrate spreads tend to have higher capital-to-gross domestic product (GDP) ratios. The right panel illustrates that a higher capital-to-GDP ratio is associated with a greater level of GDP per capita. Dub this the capital-deepening e¤ect of …nancial intermediation. Next, turn to the left panel in Figure 3 . Observe that lower interest-rate spreads are also linked with higher levels of total factor productivity, TFP. This would happen when better intermedia-tion tends to redirect funds to the more e¢ cient …rms. The right panel displays how higher levels of TFP are connected with larger per-capita GDP. Call this the reallocation e¤ect arising from …nancial intermediation. The capital deepening and reallocation e¤ects from improved intermediation play an important role in what follows. While the above facts are stylized, to be sure, empirical researchers have used increasingly sophisticated methods to tease out the relationship between …nancial intermediation and growth. This literature is surveyed masterfully by Levine (2005) . An early example of the empirical research examining the link between …nancial intermediation and growth is the well-known paper by King and Levine (1993) . The upshot is that …nancial development has a causal e¤ect on economic development; speci…cally, …nancial development leads to higher rates of growth in income and productivity.
The impact of …nancial development on economic development is investigated here, quantitatively, using a costly state veri…cation model that was developed by Greenwood et al. (2010) . The source of inspiration for the framework is the classic work by Townsend (1979) and Williamson (1986) . It has two novel twists, however. First, …rms monitor cash ‡ows as in Townsend (1979) and Williamson (1986) ; however, here the e¢ ciency of this activity depends on both the amount of resources devoted to it and the productivity of the monitoring technology used in the …nancial sector. Second, …rms have ex ante di¤erences in the structure of returns that they o¤er. A …nancial theory of …rm size emerges. At any point in time, …rms o¤ering high expected returns are underfunded (relative to a world without informational frictions), whereas others yielding low expected returns are overfunded. This results from diminishing returns in information production. As the e¢ ciency of the …nancial sector rises (relative to the rest of the economy), funds are redirected away from less productive …rms in the economy toward more productive ones. Furthermore, as the interest-rate spread declines and the cost of borrowing falls, capital deepening occurs in the economy.
The model is calibrated to match some stylized facts for the U. these facts also appears to be reasonable; it does this with little change in the capital-tooutput ratio. In the model, improvements in …nancial intermediation account for 29 percent of U.S. growth. The framework also is capable of mimicking the striking decline in the Taiwanese interest-rate spread. At the same time, it predicts a signi…cant rise in the capitalto-output ratio. It is estimated that dramatic improvements in Taiwan's …nancial sector accounted for 45 percent of the country's economic growth.
The calibrated model is then applied to the cross-country data. It performs reasonably well in predicting the di¤erences in cross-country capital-to-output ratios. Similarly, it does a good job of matching the empirical relationship between …nancial development and average Limited investor protection is emphasized by Castro et al. (2009) . They build a twosector model to explain the positive cross-country correlation between investment and GDP.
They note that the capital-goods sector is risky. This risk makes capital goods expensive to produce in poor countries with limited investor protection because of high …nance costs.
An implication of their framework is that the correlation between investment and GDP is weaker when measured at domestic vis-à-vis international prices. This is true in the data. A close cousin to the notion of limited investor protection is the idea of limited enforceability of contracts. Buera et al. (2011) focus on the importance of limited enforceability of contracts in distorting the allocation of entrepreneurial talent in the economy. This helps explain TFP di¤erentials across nations. The interplay between the enforceability of contracts and the allocation of managerial talent for explaining cross-country productivity di¤erences is also investigated by Erosa and Cabrillana (2008) in a similar framework, albeit with more of a theoretical emphasis. Finally, Midrigan and Xu (2010) challenge the view that the borrowing constraints induced by limited enforceability of contracts create large reallocation e¤ects via the distortion of factor inputs across …rms. They argue that …rms can quickly grow out of the implied borrowing constraints.
2 The economy
The analysis focuses on two types of agents: …rms and …nancial intermediaries. Firms produce output using capital and labor. Their production processes are subject to idiosyncratic productivity shocks. The realized value of the productivity shock is a …rm's private information. All funding for capital must be raised from …nancial intermediaries. This is done before the technology shock is observed. After seeing its shock, a …rm hires labor on a spot market.
When …nancing its capital a …rm enters into a …nancial contract with an intermediary. This contract speci…es the state-contingent payment that a …rm must make to an intermediary on completing production. Hidden in the background are consumers/workers, who supply a …xed amount of labor to the economy. They also deposit funds with an intermediary that earn a …xed rate of return. Given the focus here on comparative steady states, an analysis of consumers/workers can be safely suppressed. The behavior of …rms and intermediaries is described below in more detail.
Firms
Firms hire capital, k, and labor, l, to produce output, o, in line with the constant-returnsto-scale production function
The productivity level of a …rm's production process is represented by x . It is the product of two components: an aggregate one, x, and an idiosyncratic one, . The idiosyncratic level of productivity is a random variable. Speci…cally, the realized value of is drawn from the two-point set = f 1 ; 2 g, with 1 < 2 . The set di¤ers across …rms. Call this the …rm's type. Let Pr( = 1 ) = 1 and Pr( = 2 ) = 2 = 1
1 . The probabilities for the low and high states (1 and 2, respectively) are the same across …rms. The realized value of 2 is a …rm's private information. For now take the aggregate level of productivity, x, to be some known constant.
Suppose that a type-…rm has raised k units of capital. It then draws the productivity shock i . It must now decide how much labor, l i , to hire at the wage rate w. In other words, the …rm solves the maximization problem shown below.
Denote the optimal amount of labor that a type-…rm will hire in state i by
Substituting the implied solution for l i into the maximand and solving yields the unit return function, R( i ; w), or
Think about r i ( ) = R( i ; w) as giving the gross rate of return on a unit of capital invested in a type-…rm, given that state i occurs. Finally, represent the amount of output that a type-…rm will produce in state i by
where k( ) = k( 1 ; 2 ) is the size of the loan that will be received by this …rm. The next section discusses how this loan is determined.
Financial intermediaries
Intermediation is competitive. Intermediaries raise funds from consumers and lend them to …rms. Even though an intermediary knows a …rm's type, , it cannot observe the state of a …rm's business either costlessly or perfectly. That is, the intermediary cannot costlessly observe , o, and l. Suppose a …rm's true productivity in a period is i . It reports to the intermediary that its productivity is j , which may di¤er from i . The intermediary can audit this report. It seems reasonable to presume that the odds of detecting fraud are increasing in the amount of labor devoted to verifying the claim, l mj , decreasing in the size of the loan, k (because there will be more activity to monitor), and rising in the productivity of the monitoring technology, z.
Let P ij (l mj ; k; z) denote the probability that the …rm is caught cheating conditional on the following: (1) the true realization of productivity is i ; (2) the …rm makes a report of j ; (3) the intermediary allocates l mj units of labor to monitor the claim; (4) the size of the loan is k (which represents the scale of the project); (5) the level of productivity in the monitoring activity is z. The function P ij (l mj ; k; z) is increasing in l mj and z and decreasing in k. Additionally, let P ij (l mj ; k; z) = 0 if the …rm truthfully reports that its type is i (i.e.,
for a report j 6 = i ;
0;
for a report j = i :
Suppose that loan size, k, increases. Let the intermediary raise the amount of labor, l mj , that it will use to monitor a claim of state j by the same proportion. Observe that the odds of detecting malfeasance, P ij (l mj ; k; z), will fall (for a report of j 6 = i ) because < . In this sense, there are diminishing returns to scale in monitoring.
The intermediary gives a …rm a loan of size k. In exchange for providing the loan the intermediary collects some speci…ed state-contingent payments from the …rm. The rents that accrue to a …rm depend on the true state of its technology, i , the state that it reports, j , plus the outcome of any monitoring that is done. Clearly, a …rm will have no incentive to misreport when the bad state, 1 , occurs. Similarly, the intermediary will never monitor a good report, j = 2 ; it will audit only bad ones, j = 1 . If it …nds malfeasance, then 2 To guarantee that P ij (l mj ; k; z) 0 this speci…cation requires, when j 6 = i , that some minimal level of labor must be devoted to monitoring; that is, l mj > 1= (k=z) == . Note that this minimal labor requirement for monitoring can be made arbitrarily small by picking a large enough value for ". The choice of " can be thought of as normalization relative to the level of productivity in the production of monitoring services; see Greenwood et al. (2010) for more detail.
the intermediary should exert maximal punishment, which amounts to seizing everything or r 2 k. If it does not, then it should take all of the bad state returns, or r 1 k. These latter two features help to create, in a least-cost manner, an incentive for the …rm to tell the truth. The above features are embedded in the contracting problem presented below. A more formal, step-by-step analysis is presented in Greenwood et al. (2010) .
Turn now to the contracting problem. Intermediation is competitive. Therefore, an intermediary must choose the details of the …nancial contract to maximize the expected rents for a …rm. Otherwise, the …rm will take out a loan elsewhere. Competition implies that all intermediaries earn zero pro…ts on their lending activity. Suppose that intermediaries can raise funds from savers at the interest rate b r. If the depreciation rate on physical capital is , then the cost of supplying capital is e r = b r + . The intermediary's optimization problem can be expressed as
subject to
The objective function P(2) gives the expected rents for a …rm. These rents accrue from the fact that the …rm has private information about its state. Suppose that the …rm lies about being in the good state. When it does not get caught, it can pocket the amount
The odds of not getting caught are 1 P 21 (l m1 ; k; z). The good state occurs with probability 2 . An incentive-compatible contract o¤ers the …rm the same amount for telling the truth that it can get by lying.
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Equation (3) is the intermediary's zeropro…t condition. The expected return from the project is [ 1 r 1 ( ) + 2 r 2 ( )]k. Out of 3 This is the dual of the problem presented in Greenwood et al. (2010) . 4 Let p 2 represent the payment that a …rm makes to the intermediary in the good state. The incentive constraint for the contract will read
The left-hand side of this equation represents what the …rm will obtain by lying, while the right-hand side shows what it will receive when it tells the truth. The latter must dominate, in a weak sense, the former. this amount the intermediary must give the …rm 2 [1 P 21 (l m1 ; k; z)][r 2 ( ) r 1 ( )]k. The expected cost of monitoring low-state returns is 1 wl m1 . The cost of supplying the capital is e rk. Represent the optimal amount of labor required to monitor a type-…rm in state 1 by l m1 ( ) = l m1 ( 1 ; 2 ). The contract presumes that the intermediary is committed to monitoring all reports of a bad state. Likewise, denote the quantity of capital that is lent to a type-…rm by k( ) = k( 1 ; 2 ). Finally, for some types of …rms a loan may entail a loss; the intermediary will not lend to these …rms.
Stationary equilibrium
The focus of the analysis is solely on stationary equilibria. Firms di¤er by type, = ( 1 ; 2 ) with 1 < 2 . Denote the space of types by T R 2 + . Suppose that …rms are distributed over productivities in accordance with the distribution function
For all …rms …x the odds of drawing state i at Pr( = 1 ) = i . This distribution F can then be thought of as specifying the mean, 1 1 + 2 2 , and variance, 1 2 ( 1 2 ) 2 , of project returns across …rms. So, which …rms will receive funding in equilibrium?
To answer this question, focus on the zero-pro…t condition for intermediaries (3). Now consider a …rm of type . Clearly, if 1 r 1 ( )k + 2 r 2 ( )k e rk < 0, then the intermediary will incur a loss on any loan of size k > 0. Likewise, if 1 r 1 k + 2 r 2 k e rk > 0, then it will be possible to make non-negative pro…ts, albeit the loan may have to be very small. Therefore, a necessary and su¢ cient condition to obtain funding is that lies in the set A(w) T de…ned by
(Recall that upon the declaration of a bad state, the …rm must turn over r 1 ( )k to the intermediary. So, it will make nothing when it truthfully reports a bad state. If the …rm gets caught cheating, then it must make the payment r 2 ( )k, so it will also earn zero rents here.) The incentive constraint will bind. Thus, P(2) maximizes the …rm's expected rents, 2 [r 2 ( )k p 2 ], subject to the zero-pro…t constraint. As in Townsend (1979) , it can be shown that the revelation principle holds, so the focus here on incentive-compatible contracts is without loss of generality.
This set shrinks with the wage, w, because r i ( ) is decreasing in w; as wages rise, a …rm becomes less pro…table.
Firms with 2 A(w) will demand l i ( 1 ; 2 ) units of labor in state i. Should one of these …rms declare that it is in state 1, then the intermediary will send l m1 ( 1 ; 2 ) units of labor to audit it. Recall that labor is in …xed supply. Suppose there is one unit in aggregate. The labor-market-clearing condition will then appear as Z A(w)
It is now time to take stock of the situation thus far by presenting a de…nition of the equilibrium under study.
De…nition 1 Set the steady-state cost of capital at e r. A stationary competitive equilibrium is described by a set of labor allocations, l i and l m1 , a loan size, k, and a value, v, for each …rm, a set of active …rms, A(w), and a wage rate, w, such that:
1. The loan, k, o¤ered by the intermediary maximizes the value of a …rm, v, in line with P(2), given the prices e r and w. The intermediary hires labor for monitoring in the amount l m1 , as also speci…ed by P(2).
2. A …rm is o¤ered a loan if and only if it lies in the active set, A(w), as de…ned by equation (4).
3. A …rm hires labor, l i , to maximize its pro…ts in accordance with P(1), given wages, w, and the size of the loan, k, o¤ered by the intermediary.
Intermediaries need to have systems in place to monitor cash ‡ows or face the prospect of lower-than-promised returns. This is true regardless of whether investment funds are internally or externally generated. In times past, banks required borrowers to keep their funds in an account with them so that transactions could be monitored. Even a privately funded …rm needs to be monitored, unless the scale is so small that the owner can operate it himself. Family-owned …rms may mitigate the monitoring problem and are prevalent in poorer countries; see Caselli and Gennaioli (forthcoming) for a model of family-owned enterprises.
Managers and workers tend to siphon funds from the providers of capital, regardless of whether they are banks, bondholders, private owners, shareholders, or venture capitalists.
At the micro level, this is what a shirking worker in a fast-food restaurant does. Computer surveillance software, called HyperActive Bob, designed to catch such a person is available from HyperActive Technologies for $200 a month. 6 In a dynamic contracting setting, with monitoring, it may appear at some points in time that the …rm is relying heavily on internally generated funds to …nance investments. This is especially true for older …rms. Yet starting the …rm may have required funding from outside investors. Without the ability to monitor cash ‡ows, investors may …nd that projects that require large upfront funds for payo¤s that occur far in the future may deliver very disappointing returns. In fact, starting such a venture may not be feasible if investors cannot monitor the cash ‡ows during the critical stages of the enterprise's developmen; see Cole et al. (2012) for an example. Measures of external …nancing also survey …rms relatively late in their growth cycle. They do not capture the fact that start-ups use capital from private investors, such as venture capitalists.
The e¢ ciency of monitoring, z, is likely to depend on the state of technology in the …-nancial sector, both in terms of human and physical capital. Better information technologies than the consumption-goods one. As just discussed, it would be possible to have a screening stage where the intermediary veri…es the initial type of a …rm. It may not be possible to detect perfectly a …rm's type. Even so, it may be feasible to design a contract that will reveal it. The ability to screen, albeit imperfectly, may play an important role in designing such a contract. See the classic paper by Boyd and Prescott (1986) for such an approach. That is, in the current setting, a …rm must pay the amount r 1 k in the low state, but one could imagine that limited investor protection might reduce this to some smaller amount.
Before proceeding to the quantitative analysis, some mechanics of the above framework are inspected in a heuristic manner; for a more formal analysis, see Greenwood et al. (2010) .
The presence of diminishing returns to information production leads to a …nancial theory of …rm size, as will be discussed. In fact, the diminishing returns to information production can be thought of as providing a microfoundation for the Lucas (1978) span of control model.
The framework also speci…es a link between the state of …nancial development and the state of economic development. Some of the mechanics are detailed now.
1. A …rm's production is governed by constant returns to scale. In the absence of …nancial market frictions, no rents would be earned on production. Additionally, in a frictionless world only …rms o¤ering the highest expected return would be funded. In this situation, (4). With …nancial market frictions, 1 r 1 ( )+ 2 r 2 ( ) > e r for all funded projects 2 A(w), a fact easily gleaned from equation (3). Thus, deserving projects-those 2 B(w)
fx : max x2T [ 1 r 1 (x) + 2 r 2 (x)]g-will be underfunded, while undeserving projects-= 2 B(w)-are simultaneously overfunded. Funded …rms will earn rents, v, as given by P(2).
2. What determines the size of a …rm's loan? By glancing at the left-hand side of equation (3), which details the intermediary's pro…ts, it looks likely that the …rm's loan will be increasing in the project's expected return, 1 r 1 ( )+ 2 r 2 ( ), ceteris paribus. This is true:
Recall that the odds of detecting fraud, P 21 (l m1 ; k; z), decrease in loan size, k. Therefore, more labor must be allocated to monitor the project in response to an increase in loan size.
Similarly, a …rm's loan will decrease in the project's risk, as measured by r 2 ( ) r 1 ( );
note that the variance in returns for a type-…rm is given by 1 2 [r 2 ( ) r 1 ( )] 2 . When the spread between the high and low states widens, the incentive is stronger for the …rm to misreport its returns. Recall that the gain from lying is given by the objective function in P(2). To counter this the intermediary must devote more labor to monitoring. Diminishing returns to information production imply that loan size, k, is uniquely speci…ed as a function of expected return, 1 r 1 ( ) + 2 r 2 ( ), and risk, r 2 ( ) r 1 ( ).
3. Imagine that aggregate productivity, x, grows over time at the constant rate g
1=
and let …nancial sector productivity, z, improve at the …xed rate g. Will there be balanced growth? Conjecture that along a balanced growth path the k's, o's, and w will all grow at rate g. Also guess that A(w) and the l i 's, l m1 's, and r i ( )'s will remain constant. This conjectured solution is veri…ed in a heuristic manner. It is easy to see from the isoelastic forms of problem P(1) and equation (1) that the conjectured solution for balanced growth path will be satis…ed for the l i 's and r i ( )'s. Since the r i ( )'s remain constant so does the active set, A(w), which is spelled out in (4). What about the k's and the l m1 's? The solution guessed for k and l m1 is consistent with P(2), if P 21 does not change along a balanced growth path. From equation (2) it is clear that the odds of getting caught cheating, P 21 , will change over time, however, unless z grows at precisely the rate g. This is assumed, though. Since the l i 's and l m1 's remain …xed, if the labor-market clearing condition (5) holds at one point along the balanced path it will hold at all others. Thus, the hypothesized solution for w is consistent with labor-market clearing. Thus, the conjectured solution for balanced growth occurs.
4. Consider the case where x grows at a di¤erent rate than z. Speci…cally, for illustrative purposes, take the extreme situation where z rises while x remains …xed. Thus, there is only …nancial innovation in the economy. According to (2) the odds of detecting fraud will rise, other things equal. The rents that …rms accrue will drop, a fact that is evident from the objective function in P(2). This makes it feasible for …nancial intermediaries to o¤er …rms larger loans, ceteris paribus, as can be gleaned from equation (3). The implied increase in the economy's aggregate capital stock will then drive up wages. Thus, ine¢ cient …rms will have their funding cut, as (4) makes clear. The active set of …rms, A(w), thus shrinks. Therefore, …nancial innovation operates to cull unproductive …rms. Average …rm size in the economy is the total stock of labor (1) divided by the number of …rms (or the measure of the active set).
Therefore, average …rm size increases. (The last two statements ignore the small amount of labor used in monitoring.) If z increases without bound, then the economy will enter into a frictionless world where only …rms o¤ering the highest expected return, max [ 1 r 1 ( ) + or z. So, the simulations will use a common set of parameter values for all countries, but for x and z. The U.S., Taiwan, and later, 45 other countries each have their own levels of productivity for the production and …nancial sectors, or their own x's and z's.
Fitting the model to the U.S. economy
Some parameters are standard and thus can be chosen on the basis of a priori information.
They are given conventional values. Capital's share of income, , is chosen to be 0:35, a very standard number. 7 Similarly, the depreciation rate, , is set to 0:06, another very common …gure. 8 The chosen value for the return on savings through an intermediary is e r = 0:03.
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The rest of the parameters are chosen to minimize the distance between a set of stylized facts characterizing the U.S. establishment-size distribution for the years 1974 and 2004 and the model's predictions for these facts. This is done subject to a constraint that requires that the selected values for x and z must generate the observed level of incomes and the interestrate spreads for these two years. As will be seen, the minimum distance estimation procedure amounts to selecting 11 parameters on the basis of 18 data targets. The literature provides no guidance on the appropriate choice of parameters governing the intermediary's monitoring technology and . Consequently, these parameters must be estimated. Similarly, little is known about the distribution of returns facing …rms. Let 1 be the mean across …rms for the logarithm of low shock, 1 ; that is,
denotes the variance over …rms for the shocks; that is,
In a similar vein, will represent the correlation between the low and high shocks, ln( 1 ) and ln( 2 ), in the type distribution for …rms. Assume 7 The value selected here lies in the middle of range used in the literature. Gomme and Rupert (2007) estimate a capital share toward the low end of the values used in literature for the United States, 0.283. In their analysis of the role of capital for economic development, King and Levine (1994) use an upper bound on the values found in the literature, 0.40. 8 Examples are Cooley and Prescott (1995) and Li and Sarte (2004) . 9 For the period 1800 to 1990, Siegel (1992) estimates the real return on bonds, with a maturity ranging from 2 to 20 years, to be between 3.36 percent (geometric mean) and 3.71 percent (arithmetic mean). He also estimates the real return on 90-day commercial paper to be between 2.95 percent (geometric mean) and 3.13 percent (arithmetic mean).
that these means and variances of …rm-level ln(TFP) are distributed according to a bivariate truncated normal, N ( 1 ; 2 ;
10 Normalize 1 to be 1. Of course, values for the parameters determining the productivities of the technologies used in the production and …nancial sectors, x and z, are also needed.
Let Targets ; )
The calibration procedure minimizes the distance between the vectors Targets and M (param) :
The key, then, is to choose targets that are tightly connected to the model's parameters. Two important targets in the analysis are the aggregate level of output, o, and the interest-rate spread, s. For the model, de…ne these quantities by
The interest-rate spread, s, represents the di¤erence between what the intermediary earns on its loans and what it must pay its depositors. Because the intermediary earns zero pro…ts this di¤erence is solely accounted for by the cost of monitoring.
The technological parameters, x and z, represent the e¢ ciencies of the production and …nancial sectors. Think about the steady state for the model, which is de…ned formally in de…nition 1, as providing a mapping between the aggregate level of output (per person), o, 10 This is not true in a strict sense. First, the distribution is truncated. Speci…cally, draws for ln( 1 ) and ln( 2 ) are truncated to lie within two standard deviations from the mean. Second, the draw for ln( 2 ) is further restricted to lie above the one for ln( 1 ). Thus, the lower bound for ln( 2 ) is set to maxf 1 + 2 1 ; 2 2 2 g. These quali…cations do not change the normal nature of the distribution by much.
11 Note that the value of the labor used in the …nancial sector has been left out this measure of aggregate output; that is, output could have been measured as
This omission is of second-order importance. For the United States, the model predicts that …nancial sector output is about 6 percent of GDP. The maximum value obtained in the analysis is 7 percent for Turkey The average value is 5.5 percent, with a standard deviation of 1.13 percentage points. So, this omission is small beer. and the interest-rate spread, s, on the one hand, and the state of technology in its production and …nancial sectors, x and z, on the other. an inference about (x; z), given an observation on (o; s), by using the relationship
Given the importance of these two parameters, this condition is used as a constraint in the minimization of the distance between Targets and M (param). Equation (6) also plays an important role in the cross-country analysis.
The distribution of returns across …rms is integrally related to the distribution of employment across them. Firms with high returns will have high employment, other things equal. Figure 4 illustrates a …rm's employment, l i , as a function of its capital stock, k, and the realized value of the technological shock, i . A …rm that receives a bigger loan, k, will hire more labor, l i , other things equal. Recall that the size of the loan is determined before the technology shock is realized. Given the size of its loan, a …rm will hire more labor the higher is the realized state of its technology shock. Given this relationship, the size distributions of …rms for 1974 and 2004 are chosen as data targets to determine the remaining seven parameters.
Seven points on the distribution are picked for each year. As is well known, the size distribution of …rms is highly skewed to the right; that is, there are many small …rms, employing a relatively small amount of labor in total, and a few large ones, hiring many more workers. 
and
Thus, following this strategy, 18 targets (including the o U S 's and s U S 's) are used to calibrate 11 parameters (including the x U S 's and z U S 's).
The upshot of the above …tting procedure is now discussed. Table 1 . 
The United States, balanced growth
It would be reasonable to argue, for the purposes of the current analysis, that the U.S.
economy is characterized by a situation of balanced growth. First, there is only a small shift in the U.S. …rm-size distribution between 1974 and 2004 (see the bottom-right panel in Figure 5 ). Second, the economy's interest-rate spread shows only a modest decline (recall Figure 1) . Third, the capital-to-output ratio displays a small increase (again, Figure 1 ).
Finance is important in the model. This can be gauged by asking the following coun- Yearly growth in …nancial productivity 2.58%
Taiwan, unbalanced growth
Return now to the Taiwanese scenario shown in Figure 1 . Taiwan experienced a large drop in the interest-rate spread between 1974 and 2004 that was accompanied by a signi…cant increase in the economy's capital-to-GDP ratio. This is clearly a situation of unbalanced growth. Recall that the steady state for the model provides a mapping between productivity in the production and …nancial sectors on the one hand, x and z, and output and interest-rate spreads, o and s, on the other. This mapping can be inverted to infer x and z using observations on o and s using equation (6), given a vector of parameter values, p. Take Yearly growth in …nancial productivity 9.90%
Cross-country analysis
Move on now to the cross-country analysis. In particular, a sample of 45 countries, the intersection of all the nations in the Penn World Tables and the Beck et al. (2000 Beck et al. ( , 2001 dataset, will be studied. For each country j, a technology vector (x j ; z j ) is backed out using data on per-capita GDP and interest-rate spreads (o j ; s j ), given the procedure implied by equation (6) while setting p to the estimated parameter vector for the U.S. economy.
Erosa (2001) uses interest-rate spreads to quantify the e¤ects of …nancial intermediation on occupational choice. It is not a forgone conclusion that this can always be done; that is, that a set of technology parameters can be found such that (6) always holds. 12 (The cross-country results are reported in Table 10 in the appendix.) By construction the model explains all the variation in output and interest-rate spreads across countries.
13
Still, one could ask how well the measure for the state of technology in the …nancial sector that is backed out using the model correlates with independent measures of …nancial intermediation. Here, take the ratio of private credit by deposit banks and other …nancial institutions to GDP as a measure of …nancial intermediation as reported by Beck et al. (2000 Beck et al. ( , 2001 . (Other measures produce similar results but reduce the sample size too much.) Additionally, one could examine how well the model explains cross-country di¤erences in capital-to-GDP ratios. Table 4 reports the …ndings. The correlation between the imputed state of technology in the …nancial sector and the independent Beck et al. (2000 Beck et al. ( , 2001 ) measure of …nancial intermediation is quite high (see Table 4 and Figure 6 ). Thus, it appears reasonable to 12 Theoretically speaking, there is a maximum interest-rate spread that the model can match. When the …nancial sector becomes too ine¢ cient, it no longer pays to monitor loans. When z falls (relative to x) the aggregate volume of lending declines. The wage rate will decline along with the economy's capital stock. As this happens, the r 1 's rise [see (1)]. Take the …rms with the highest value of r 1 and denote this by r 1 . By de…nition, r 1 = r 1 ( ), where = arg max 2T fr 1 ( )g. Eventually, r 1 will hit e r. At this point, a Williamson (1986)-style credit-rationing equilibrium emerges. In the credit-rationing equilibrium, r 1 = e r. Here type…rms will pay the …xed interest rate r 1 and they will not be monitored. Because r 2 > e r for these …rms, they would demand as big a loan as possible. Thus, their credit must be rationed. The interest-rate spread on these loans will be zero. Note that r 1 can never exceed e r, because in…nite pro…t opportunities would then emerge in the economy. Thus, the interest-rate spread is a \-shaped function of z. (The interest-rate spread also approaches zero as z ! 1, or when the economy asymptotes to the frictionless competitive equilibrium. As z ! 0 the fraction of loans that are not monitored eventually approaches 1, implying that the interestrate spread will drop to zero.) The peak of the \ function is the maximum permissible interest-rate spread allowed by the model. 13 The model predicts a positive association between a country's rate of investment and its GDP; Castro et al. (2009, Figure 1) show that this is true. As mentioned, it is stronger when investment spending is measured at international prices as opposed to domestic ones. This puzzle could be resolved here by adopting aspects of Castro et al.'s (2009) two-sector analysis.
use the constructed values of z to investigate the relationship between output and …nancial development. Now the backed-out measure for the e¢ ciency of the …nancial sector correlates well with a country's adoption of information technologies (see the upper-left panel in Figure   6 ). It also is strongly associated with a country's human capital (upper-right panel) and the maturity of its legal system (lower-right panel). These three factors should make intermediation more e¢ cient for the reasons discussed in Section 3. Indeed, Figure 6 (lower-left panel) also illustrates how the ratio of overhead cost to assets, a measure of e¢ ciency, declines with the constructed ln(z). Another measure of …nancial e¢ ciency for the model is k=l m ; this was discussed earlier. This too correlates well with the independent Beck et al. (2000 Beck et al. ( , 2001 measure of …nancial intermediation.
As can be seen, the capital-to-output ratios predicted by the model are positively associated with those in the data. The correlation is reasonably large. That these two correlations are not perfect should be expected. Other factors, such as the big di¤erences in public policies discussed in Parente and Prescott (2000) , may explain a large part of the cross-country di¤erences in capital-to-output ratios. Di¤erences in monetary policies across nations may in ‡uence cross-country interest-rate spreads. Additionally, there is noise in these numbers given the manner of their construction (see the appendix). HND  TUR GTM  NIC  BRA  PER  BOL  PHL  SLV  COL  PAN  MEX  LKA  IND  CRI  URY  ZAF   THA  DNK  ESP  MUS  ITA  USA  ISR FRA  SWE  PRT  GBR  AUT  BEL NOR NLD  JPN CHE  FIN   AUS   IRL   LUX   UGA   KEN   HND  TUR  GTM  NIC  BRA  PER  BOL  PHL  SLV  COL  PAN  MEX  LKA IND  CRI  URY  ZAF   THA  DNK  ESP  MUS ITA  USA  ISR  FRA  SWE  PRT  GBR  AUT  BEL  NOR  NLD  JPN  CHE Lanka ($33,524 versus $3,967) . Therefore, given the higher wages, monitoring will be more expensive in the United States. For both countries to have the same interest-rate spread, e¢ ciency in the U.S. …nancial sector must be higher. Before proceeding on to a discussion of the importance of …nancial development for economic development, note that the …ndings do not change much if the model is matched up with capital-to-output ratios or overhead costs (see Figure 6 ) instead of the Beck et al. (2000 Beck et al. ( , 2001 interest-rate spreads. This is discussed in Section 6.
The importance of …nancial development for economic development
It is now possible to gauge how important e¢ ciency in the …nancial sector is for economic development, at least in the model. To this end, let the best industrial and …nancial practices in the world be denoted by x maxfx i g and z maxfz i g, respectively. Represent country The shortfall in output from the inability to attain best practices is O(x; z) O(x i ; z i ). The United States has the highest value for x and Luxembourg for z.
The percentage gain in output for country i by moving to the best …nancial practice is
The results for this experiment are plotted in Figure   7 . As can be seen, the gains are quite sizable. On average, a country could increase its GDP by 58 percent and TFP by 12 percent. The country with the worst …nancial system, Uganda, would experience a 116 percent rise in output and its TFP would increase by 23 percent.
While sizable, these gains in GDP are small relative to the increase needed to move a country onto the frontier for income, O(x; z). The percentage of the gap that is closed by a movement to best …nancial practice is measured by 100 [O( Table 10 in the appendix.
Therefore, the importance of …nancial intermediation for economic development depends on one's outlook. World output would rise by 53 percent by moving all countries to the best …nancial practice (see Table 5 ). This is a sizable gain. Still, it would close only 31 percent of the gap between actual and potential world output. Dispersion in cross-country output would fall by about 15 percentage points from 77 percent to 62 percent. Financial development explains about 23 percent of cross-country dispersion in output by this metric. Reduction in gap between actual and potential world output, % 30.8
Increase in world TFP, % 13.5
Fall in dispersion of ln(output) across countries,% 22.8
Fall in (pop-wghtd) mean of (cap-wghtd) distortion,% 14.7
Fall in (pop-wghtd) mean dispersion of (cap-wghtd) distortion, % 9.5 Restuccia and Rogerson (2008) started a strand in the literature about the importance of idiosyncratic distortions that create heterogeneity in the prices faced by individual producers.
Although they do not identify the sources of those distortions, they do show they can generate di¤erences in TFP in the range of 30 to 50 percent. Guner et al. (2008) analyze the possible impact of size-dependent policies, such as the restrictions on retailing in Japan favoring small stores, on an economy. Here, the presence of informational frictions causes the expected marginal product of capital, 1 r 1 + 2 r 2 , to deviate from its user cost, e r. The distortion is modeled endogenously. De…ne the induced distortion in investment by d = 1 r 1 + 2 r 2 e r.
For a country such as Uganda these deviations are fairly large. Finally, the model predicts that larger …rms should be found in countries with more developed …nancial systems. There does not appear to be a dataset that measures …rm size in a consistent manner across countries. Beck et al. (2006) argue that the best available strategy is to use the size of the largest 100 companies in a country. They …nd a positive relationship exists between the development of a country's …nancial system and …rm size, after controlling for the size of the economy, income per capita, and several …rm and industry characteristics. As an example, their estimation implies that if Turkey had the same level of development in the …nancial sector as Korea (a country with a more developed …nancial system), the average size of the largest …rms in Turkey would more than double.
On this point, imagine running a regression of the following form for both the data and the model:
Firm size in the data is measured by average annual sales per …rm (in U.S. dollars) for the top 100 …rms, as taken from Beck et al. (2006) . For the analogue in the model, simply use a country's GDP divided by the measure of active set A to obtain output per …rm. [Once again the data for interest-rate spreads are obtained from Beck et al. (2000 Beck et al. ( , 2001 .] Controls are added for a country's GDP and population in the regression for the data, while for the model they are added just for GDP. 14 The same list of countries is used for both the data and model.
The upshot of the analysis is shown in Table 6 . A negative relationship is found in the cross-country data between the interest-rate spread and average …rm size. The model also produces a negative relationship between these variables. The similarity between the size of the interest-rate spread coe¢ cient, , for the data and model is reassuring. Additionally, the data estimate of = 22 implies that if a country with an interest-rate spread of 10 percentage points (which is among the worst 5 percent of nations in terms of …nancial development) could reduce its spread to just 3 percentage points (which would place it in the upper 5 percent of countries), then the average size of its top 100 …rms would increase 14 The idea here is that larger countries, as measured by income or population, would tend to have larger …rms. In a frictionless world …rms could locate anywhere, so there would be no need for such a connection to hold. Nontraded goods, productivity di¤erences across countries, restrictions on trade, transportation costs, and so on would all lead to a positive association between average …rm size, on the one hand, and income or population, on the other. by 154 percent. This is roughly in accord with Beck et al.'s (2006) …nding discussed above, given that Turkey had one of the worst …nancial systems while Korea had one of the best. Two alternative strategies for matching the model with international data will now be investigated. The story developed here has abstracted away from the importance of …rm-level …nancing constraints studied by others. The importance of internal …nance in the developed framework may not be as simple as it may …rst appear. While it may be tempting to draw on the familiar intuition developed elsewhere on the importance of internal …nance-say in the debt default literature-it is questionable whether this carries over to the current setting.
The central idea presented here is that unless the owners of a …rm operate it themselves, they will always have to monitor cash ‡ows. Otherwise, they run the risk that these ‡ows will be expropriated by managers and workers. For example, imagine a publicly listed …rm that raises all of the funds for its current investment from its cash ‡ow. Does this mean that the …rm's owners (the stockholders) do not need to monitor the company's cash ‡ows-of course not. The point is that they own the sources of all revenue ‡ows, including those used for internal …nance, and need a mechanism to verify them. The assumption here is that the cost of monitoring capital raised from banks and other intermediaries (as measured by interest-rate spreads) is a good proxy for the cost of monitoring capital more generally, raised either externally or internally. Suppose, to the contrary, that internal funds do not need to be monitored. Then the importance of the mechanism outlined here would be exaggerated.
Is there evidence of this in the analysis?
If internal funds do not require monitoring, then the model should overstate the impact of interest-rate spreads on capital-to-output ratios. If so, the model would then display a steeper relationship between capital-to-output ratios and interest-rate spreads than is observed in the data. There does not seem to be any evidence of this (see the right-panel of Figure 9 ). Indeed, the model does quite well mimicking the relationship between capital-tooutput ratios and interest-rate spreads. Suppose the model is matched up with the observed capital-to-output ratios, k=o, instead of the observed interest-rate spreads, s. If internal …nance can be used to reduce the monitoring costs associated with external …nance, then the backed-out values for the z's (the productivities of the monitoring technologies) should now be higher than under the baseline matching scheme for countries with high interest-rate spreads. In e¤ect, the computed z's will re ‡ect a mixture of low-cost internal …nance and the high-cost external option. The estimated gains from moving to best …nancial practice should be much smaller. Table 7 reports the results. As can be seen, a worldwide move to best …nancial practice still leads to a sizable gain in world output and TFP and a large drop in the dispersion of output across countries. (A listing of the …ndings for each country is presented in Table 11 in the appendix.) Interest-rate spread Capital-to-GDP ratio, data and model Figure 9 : The right panel shows the relationship between interest-rate spreads and capitalto-output ratios for the data and model. The left panel plots the relationship between interest-rate spreads and overhead costs for the data. death rates for …rms or technology shocks that lack persistence. Indeed, a …rm-dynamics model with …nancial constraints may have di¢ culty accounting for the observed pattern of capital-output ratios and interest-rate spreads (Figure 9 ). Such models often emphasize a di¤erent mechanism: the impact that …nancing constraints have on TFP, through the selection of entrepreneurs, as opposed to the impact on the aggregate capital-to-output ratio.
One could also argue that the …nancial sector is not competitive in less-developed countries and that this accounts for their high interest-rate spreads. Suppose that the …nancial sector is monopolized in some countries. Intuitively, one may expect that monopolies might charge borrowers higher interest rates on loans and o¤er depositors lower rates on their savings (relative to the situation of perfect competition). Therefore, such monopolistic practices would be re ‡ected in interest-rate spreads. These monopolies should still try to minimize the costs of doing business. In other words, unless there are technological di¤erences across countries, there should be no correlation between overhead costs and interest-rate spreads.
Yet there is a strong one as Figure 9 (left panel) displays. Furthermore, the …ndings are similar if these overhead costs, , are used as a proxy for the e¢ ciency of the …nancial sector instead of interest-rate spreads, s (shown in Table 7 ). (Table 12 in the appendix gives the results for each country.) Thus, the model also works for a direct measure of …nancial e¢ ciency. (Of course, one could make some type of x-e¢ ciency argument, but developing this would require a quite di¤erent framework.) Overall the results appear to be remarkably robust to a variety of matching strategies.
Conclusions
Again, how important is …nancial development for economic development? To address this question, a costly state veri…cation model is applied to both U.S. and cross-country data.
The model has two unique features: First, …nancial intermediaries choose how much labor to devote to monitoring their loan activity. The odds of detecting malfeasance are a function of this choice. They also depend on the technology used in the …nancial sector. The average coe¢ cient of variation in the distortion within a country is 62 percent. World output could increase by 53 percent if all countries adopted the best …nancial practice in the world. Adopting this leading-edge practice leads to funds being redirected away from ine¢ cient …rms toward more productive ones. This reallocation e¤ect is re ‡ected by a rise in world TFP by 13.5 percent. Still, this accounts only for 31 percent of the gap between actual and potential world output because the bulk of the di¤erences in cross-country per-capita GDP are explained by the huge di¤erences in the productivity of the non…nancial sector.
The results are robust to changes in the matching strategy for backing out the cross-country productivities in the …nancial and non…nancial sectors. Table B .100). For Taiwan, the spread is obtained from Lu (2008) . The initial capital-to-GDP ratio in each country is normalized to 1 (to control for di¤erent de…nitions of the capital stock). 
